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Deviant voices in the history of Pāṇinian grammar 
The philologist who occupies himself with Indian texts has to work with 
texts that have survived until today. This is a truism, but one whose 
implications are not always fully realised. Texts in the Indian subcontinent 
that were composed more than just a few centuries ago and were not 
chiseled into stone or engraved on copper have only survived if they were 
regularly copied. Manuscripts that are more than five centuries old are 
exceptional in India, and most do not live as long as that. I do not know the 
average life expectancy of a manuscript in India; I am sure that it varies a lot 
from region to region depending on climatic and other conditions. I am 
however certain that for texts that were composed more than a thousand 
years ago we depend, with rare exceptions, on manuscripts that were copied 
from earlier manuscripts. 
 The implication of this well-known state of affairs is that texts that are 
no longer copied from a certain date onward do not leave surviving copies. 
The question whether these texts were or were not widely read in their time 
is irrelevant. All that counts is the interest for the text during subsequent 
centuries. Texts that were once important and widely studied may yet have 
disappeared for the simple reason that later generations were not interested 
in copying them. It follows that we, modern researchers, only get to see texts 
that have passed through the filter of history. This filter of history has 
nothing to do with an active suppression or indexation of texts. Texts did not 
need to be prohibited in order to disappear. They disappeared all of their 
own, because no one bothered to copy them. 
 To get a clear picture of what I am talking about, consider Buddhism. 
This religion was once extremely important in India, and many aspects of 
Indian culture have been deeply influenced by it. And yet, if we had no other 
sources about Buddhism at our disposal than the ones that have survived in 
Hindu India, our knowledge about its role in the subcontinent would be 
minimal. Most of what we know about Indian Buddhism we owe to its 
survival in the margins of the subcontinent and especially outside it. If 
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Buddhism had not survived outside India, our ignorance about its position in 
Indian history would be enormous. 
 Ājīvikism is an example of a religion that, like Buddhism, disappeared 
in India but which, unlike Buddhism, did not survive outside the 
subcontinent.1 The inscriptional evidence suggests that Ājīvikism was not 
less important than Buddhism at the time of the Mauryas. It survived in 
South India until the fourteenth or fifteenth century, almost two millenia 
after its creation. During this long period it may have exerted an influence 
on other currents of thought.2 And yet not a single Ājīvika text has survived. 
We know about the existence of this religion through inscriptions, and about 
its teachings through the criticism which others directed at it.3 The fact that 
there were no Ājīvikas for the last five centuries or so may, all by itself, be 
responsible for the present absence of texts belonging to that school. 
 Buddhism and Ājīvikism are examples of religions that could not look 
after their literary traditions in the subcontinent. A philosophical school that 
disappeared without leaving anything beyond the critical remarks of its 
opponents is the school of the Cārvākas.4 This school once had a Sūtra text 
and several commentaries, but only fragments remain in the works of its 
opponents. All of these examples illustrate that literary traditions that are not 
looked after — i.e., whose texts are not copied and recopied all the time — 
simply disappear. We know about Cārvākas and Ājīvikas from the literary 
traditions that have survived. This they owe to the circumstance that those 
surviving traditions considered the two threatening enough to feel obliged to 
criticize and reject them. In doing so they kept memories alive that might 
otherwise have been lost altogether. 
 The situation is more delicate in traditions that have survived until 
today, but which have undergone certain modifications in the process. 
Subsequent thinkers of a philosophical school, for example, are not always 
willing to enter into a debate with their predecessors on points where they 
disagree. Outside critics are not hampered in this manner. This leads to the 
remarkable situation that, in order to learn about the early history of a 
particular philosophical school, we may depend as much, sometimes more, 
on its outside critics than on its representatives whose works have survived. 
Sāṃkhya is a good example. We know from a variety of non-Sāṃkhya 
thinkers — among them Bhartrh̥ari, Dharmapāla, Mallavādin, but also the 
much later (10th century) Rāmakaṇṭha — that Sāmkhya had held the view 
                                         
1 Basham, 1951. 
2 Bronkhorst, 2007b. 
3 See Bronkhorst, 2003; 2007a: 38. 
4 Bronkhorst, 2007a: p. 150. 
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that substances are nothing but collections of qualities.5 Nothing of the kind 
appears in the surviving Sāṃkhya texts. Indeed, there is reason to think that 
the major change that took place within Sāṃkhya and that resulted in the 
abandonment of this earlier position was not brought about by a clash of 
different views, but by a transition inspired by an external challenge. The 
earlier view was henceforth simply given up by the adherents of the school. 
Only external critics went on criticizing points of view which the thinkers of 
the school itself had silently abandoned. These modified views do not only 
concern substances as collections of qualities, but also the nature of 
pradhāna, one of the key notions of Sāṃkhya. About this earlier conception 
of pradhāna we read, once again, nothing in the surviving school texts. 
What we know about it we learn from Śaṅkara and other non-Sāṃkhya 
thinkers.6 
 What we can learn from these and other examples can be expressed in 
a simple phrase: the winner takes all. The texts that have survived are the 
ones that belong to the currents of thought that have been victorious in the 
long run, for whatever reason. If, as philologists, we decide to limit our 
attention to the texts that have survived, we take the side of the victors, 
perhaps unwittingly. Worse, by doing so we run the risk of taking the side of 
the victorious tradition, which includes projecting back its vision of the past. 
Everyone is of course free to join any tradition that appeals to him or her, 
but one can have serious doubts whether joining and continuing traditions 
that happen to have survived is the task of historically oriented academics 
and university departments. 
 If we do not wish to fall in the trap to become, in Indian studies, 
second rate imitation pandits, if we wish to gain a truly historical 
understanding of, say, the history of Indian thought, we have to think twice 
before we decide to limit our attention to texts that have survived. In that 
case we have to do what is possible to obtain information about those whose 
texts have not survived. In many cases that will no doubt be impossible. 
There may have been currents of thought and practice whose very names 
have been forgotten. In such cases the modern philologist is helpless. There 
are other cases where evidence has been preserved, usually in the works of 
critics. This evidence will always be lacunary and difficult to interpret. This 
can however be no excuse for ignoring it. Quite on the contrary, it is in 
many cases our only hope to study our texts historically, i.e., to study the 
past rather than the selection of texts which more recent tradition imposes 
upon us. 
                                         
5 Bronkhorst, 1994; Watson, 2010. 
6 Bronkhorst, 2007. 
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This long introduction was necessary for what follows. The history of 
Pāṇinian grammar is all too often presented as a very orderly affair. Pāṇini 
wrote his grammar. Kātyāyana and Patañjali discussed it in their 
commentaries and tried to improve upon it in certain details. For subsequent 
commentaries nothing much remained to be done beyond elaborating and 
refining Patañjali’s observations. 
 This is the vision of its past which the orthodox Pāṇinian tradition as it 
exists today presents and favours. My claim is that it is a simplification of a 
historical development that was more complex than that. This vision leaves 
out inconvenient elements, not primarily with the intention to distort 
historical reality, but more through lack of interest in developments that 
were considered “incorrect”. Lack of interest, as we have seen, leads to loss 
of texts, so that in the end only minor references in other works allow us to 
reconstruct what really happened. 
 Note, to begin with, that I am concerned in this lecture with Pāṇinian 
grammar. There may have been grammarians who disagreed with Pāṇini and 
wrote their own grammars, but I am not concerned with them. I wish to talk 
of those who looked upon Pāṇini’s text as point of departure. These 
grammarians, who belonged all of them to the Pāṇinian tradition, were yet 
divided into different groups that did not always see eye to eye. The 
fundamental discord concerned Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya. The tradition which 
we now consider orthodox accorded full authority to Patañjali, more even 
than to Pāṇini. This is for the first time stated in so many words by Kaiyaṭa, 
more than a millennium after Patañjali. Half a millennium before Kaiyaṭa, 
and more than half a millennium after Patañjali, Bhartr ̥hari (or rather, the 
author of the Vrt̥ti, who may have been different from him) made a 
reference to a problem connected with the preservation of the Mahābhāṣya 
or its interpretation. Bhartr ̥hari may have been the first to write a 
commentary on the Mahābhāṣya. He certainly stands somewhere near the 
beginning of the apotheosis of the Mahābhāṣya that characterises henceforth 
orthodoxy. 
 This, then, was the development within the Pāṇinian tradition that 
would come to prevail. This victory was not however clear from the 
beginning. It did come, and from that moment onward no one in the 
Pāṇinian tradition was interested in the works of the heretics any longer. 
And works that inspire no interest get lost, as we have seen. There may be 
only one early work belonging to this alternative tradition that has survived: 
the Paribhāṣāvr ̥tti or Paribhāṣāsūcana attributed to Vyāḍi, most recently 
edited by Dominik Wujastyk (1993). The reason it has survived may well be 
that its differences from the orthodox tradition are minimal and do not 
attract attention. Only a detailed analysis of the surviving texts can bring to 
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light positions and ideas belonging to the non-orthodox Pāṇinian 
grammarians: their works are lost. 
 I have tried to collect some of these non-orthodox positions in a few 
publications, basing myself initially on relatively early sources: Candra’s 
grammar, the Kāśikā and, of course, Bhartr ̥hari’s commentary on the 
Mahābhāṣya.7 This led me to the inevitable conclusion that these non-
orthodox positions had been elaborated before the earliest of these three 
sources, Candra. In those publications the question could not be raised 
whether everything changed from one day to the next with the appearance of 
Candra’s grammar and Bhartrh̥ari’s commentary on the Mahābhāṣya. A 
priori that does not seem likely, for why should grammarians who do not 
recognise the Mahābhāṣya as authoritative change their minds suddenly? For 
lack of sources the question remained hypothetical. 
 Recently I have been able to make some progress in this matter. 
Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamañjarī contains a few passages that criticise a 
grammarian. They are elucidated by Cakradhara’s Nyāyamañjarī-
granthibhaṅga, which provides much precise information and informs us 
that the grammarian was called Udbhaṭa. Cakradhara’s most important 
passage is unfortunately corrupt, but there can be no doubt that Udbhaṭa 
allowed himself great liberty in interpreting Pāṇini’s sūtras so as to 
accommodate the formation of certain difficult words. He uses such tricks as 
dividing a rule in two (yogavibhāga), of changing the wording of a sūtra, 
and of deciding that a recalcitrant word is an indeclinable (nipāta). 
Cakradhara disagrees with these interpretations and presents the correct 
orthodox explanation of those same words.8 
 Udbhaṭa obviously belongs to the non-orthodox grammarians within 
the Pāṇinian tradition, who felt not bound by Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya. 
However, Udbhaṭa is much more recent than Candra and Bhartr ̥hari. E. A. 
Solomon (1978) situates him in “the final quarter of the eighth century and 
the first quarter of the ninth century” or somewhat later, i.e., around the year 
800 CE. This would imply that the deviant tradition of Pāṇinian grammar 
had not stopped at the time of Candra and Bhartr ̥hari, i.e. before the middle 
of the first millennium. On the contrary, this case suggests that it had 
continued until at least the ninth century. From, say, the fifth to the ninth 
century, it appears, at least two Pāṇinian traditions existed side by side, the 
one orthodox, the other non-orthodox. The term “orthodox” here means that 
the grammarians concerned looked upon Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya as their 
guiding light. The non-orthodox grammarians may have studied the 
                                         
7 Bronkhorst, 1983; 2002; 2002a; 2004; 2009; 2009a. 
8 Bronkhorst, 2008. 
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Mahābhāṣya, but they felt free to deviate from it wherever they considered 
that necessary or advantageous. They even felt free to modify Pāṇini’s 
sūtras, like Patañjali long before them. In a certain way they continued along 
the lines of Patañjali, unlike the orthodox grammarians, who were extremely 
hesitant to look upon themselves as being on a par with that scholar. 
 The paper read by Jan Houben at the ICHoLS conference in Potsdam 
suggests that lack of respect for Patañjali survived not only Bharṭhari, but 
Kaiyaṭa as well. The Prakriyā-Sarvasva of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa belongs to the 
16th-17th century, yet does not refer to Patañjali and shows a pronounced 
willingness to interpret Pāṇini freely. Though not being an extremist like 
Udbhaṭa, it would seem that Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa remained unaffected by the 
domination of Patañjali, and this at a very recent period. One would be keen 
to know what influences Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa acknowledges, and the results of 
Houben’s investigations are eagerly awaited.9 
 It is a pity that we know so little about the non-orthodox grammarians. 
Only a few of their texts have survived, no doubt because subsequent 
generations lost interest. No one copied their works, with the final result that 
modern scholars have long been able to think that the history of Pāṇinian 
grammar was satisfactorily described by the caricatural picture which I 
presented to you earlier. In reality the development was more complex. We 
can only hope that future research will keep this in mind. 
 
 
References 
 
BASHAM, A. L.  1951 History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas. A vanished Indian religion, 
reprint: Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass 1981. 
BRONKHORST, Johannes 1983 "On the history of Pāṇinian grammar in the early centuries 
following Patañjali", Journal of Indian Philosophy 11, 357-412. 
BRONKHORST, Johannes 1994 “The qualities of Sāṃkhya", Wiener Zeitschrift für die 
Kunde Südasiens 38, 309-322. 
BRONKHORST, Johannes 2002 "The Cāndra-vyākaraṇa: some questions", in Indian 
Linguistic Studies: Festschrift in Honor of George Cardona, Madhav M. 
DESHPANDE & Peter E. HOOK (ed.), Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass,  182-201. 
BRONKHORST, Johannes 2002a “Pāṇini's grammar: from meaning to utterance”, Annali 
(Università degli Studi di Napoli “L’Orientale”) 62,  29-39. 
BRONKHORST, Johannes 2003 “Ājīvika doctrine reconsidered”, in Essays in Jaina 
Philosophy and Religion, Piotr BALCEROWICZ (ed.), Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 
153-178. 
                                         
9 See also Houben, 2008a; 2012. 
Deviant voices in the history of Pāṇinian Grammar  
	  
53 
BRONKHORST, Johannes 2004 “More on the sources of the Kāśikā”, in Problems in Vedic 
and Sanskrit Literature, Maitreyee DESHPANDE (ed.), Delhi, New Bharatiya Book 
Corporation, 47-54. 
BRONKHORST, Johannes 2007 “On the nature of pradhāna”, in Expanding and Merging 
Horizons: Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in 
Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass, Karin PREISENDANZ (ed.), Vienna, Austrian 
Academy of Sciences Press, 373-381. 
BRONKHORST, Johannes 2007a Greater Magadha. Studies in the culture of early India, 
Leiden, Brill. 
BRONKHORST, Johannes 2007b “Echoes of Ājīvikism in medieval Indian philosophy”, 
Theatrum Mirabiliorum Indiae Orientalis: A volume to celebrate the 70th birthday 
of Professor Maria Krzysztof Byrski, Monika Nowakowska & Jacek Woźniak 
(ed.), Warszawa, Komitet Nauk Orientalistycznych Polskeij Akademii Nauk, 239-
248. 
BRONKHORST, Johannes 2008 “Udbhaṭa, a grammarian and a Cārvāka”, in Linguistic 
Traditions of Kashmir: Essays in memory of paṇḍit Dinanath Yaksha, Mrinal Kaul 
& Ashok Aklujkar (ed.), New Delhi, D. K. Printworld, 281-299. 
BRONKHORST, Johannes 2009 “The importance of the Kāśikā”, in Studies in the 
Kāśikāvṛtti. The Section on Pratyāhāras: Critical Edition, Translation and Other 
Contributions, Pascale Haag & Vincenzo Vergiani (ed.), Firenze, Società Editrice 
Fiorentina, 129-140. 
BRONKHORST, Johannes 2009a “Critique et transmission textuelles dans la tradition 
pāṇinéenne”, in Écrire et transmettre en Inde classique, Gérard Colas & Gerdi 
Gerschheimer (ed.), Paris, École française d’Extrême-Orient,  269-286. 
HOUBEN, Jan E. M.  2008 “Pāṇinian grammar of living Sanskrit: features and principles 
of the Prakriyā-Sarvasva”, Paper read at ICHoLS XI, Potsdam 2008. 
HOUBEN, Jan E. M.  2008a “Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita’s ‘small step’ for a grammarian and ‘giant 
leap’ for Sanskrit grammar”, Journal of Indian Philosophy 36, 563-574. 
HOUBEN, Jan E. M.  2012 “On the bahiraṅga-rule in Pāṇinian grammar: Nāgeśa and 
Nārāyaṇa”, in Devadattīyam: Johannes Bronkhorst Felicitation Volume, François 
Voegeli et al. (ed.), Bern, Peter Lang, 79-105. 
SOLOMON, E. A.  1978 “Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa”, Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research 
Institute 58-59,  985-992. 
WATSON, Alex 2010 “Rāmakaṇṭha’s concept of unchanging cognition (nityajñāna): 
Influence from Buddhism, Sāṃkhya and Vedānta”, in From Vasubandhu to 
Caitanya: Studies in Indian philosophy and its textual history, Johannes 
Bronkhorst & Karin Preisendanz (ed.), Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass,  79-120. 
WUJASTYK, Dominik 1993 Metarules of Pāṇinian Grammar. The Vyāḍīyaparibhāṣāvṛtti, 
critically edited with translation and commentary, 2 vols., Groningen, Egbert 
Forsten. 
 



